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HOW LAW FIRMS CAN DO GOOD WHILE DOING
WELL (AND THE ANSWER IS NOT PRO BONO) 1
Russell Pearce*
I was speaking with a transactional lawyer whom I hadn’t seen in many
years. He spoke with passion about his work. He was making good
money. He was working on important deals. He took pride that when he
worked on a deal, all the parties understood what the deal was about, and
the deals were basically fair. Then he started to apologize. He started to
apologize for not doing good in his career as a lawyer. In law school, he
had done some public interest work, and he never followed up on it; then,
as a lawyer, he didn’t do a lot of pro bono.
So why did this lawyer feel the need to apologize? His work was
important, and he did it in an honorable way, but he subscribed to a basic
tenet of professionalism, the business/profession dichotomy. 2 Business
people work primarily for self-interest. Professionals—lawyers—work
primarily for the public good. 3 Applied to the legal profession, that divides
* Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics, Fordham
University School of Law.
1. For an outstanding examination of this topic with regard to the work of plaintiffs’
lawyers in mass tort cases, see Howard M. Erichson, Doing Good, Doing Well, 57 VAND. L.
REV. 2087 (2004).
2. See Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding
Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1229, 1238-42 (1995) [hereinafter Pearce, Professionalism Paradigm]. For a more
extensive discussion of the dichotomy’s foundation in professionalism rhetoric, see Russell
G. Pearce et al., Revitalizing the Lawyer-Poet: What Lawyers Can Learn From Rock and
Roll, 14 WIDENER L.J. 907, at nn. 4-18 and accompanying text (2005) [hereinafter Pearce et
al., Revitalizing the Lawyer-Poet].
3. Pearce, Professionalism Paradigm, supra note 2, at 1239. In Roscoe Pound’s
classic formulation, a profession describes:
a group of men pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of a public
service—no less a public service because it may incidentally be a means of
livelihood. Pursuit of the learned art in the spirit of a public service is the primary
purpose. Gaining a livelihood is incidental, whereas in a business or trade it is the
entire purpose.
ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953). See AMERICAN
BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON PROFESSIONALISM, “ . . . IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE”: A
BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 10 (1986) (noting that “the
spirit of Dean Pound’s definition withstands the test of time”).
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us into saints and sinners. 4 If, like my acquaintance, you chose your path
in the law because you wanted to make a lot of money, you are like a
business person and thus a sinner. If you decided to be a public-interest
lawyer, then you are a saint.
It was not always this way. When Louis Brandeis wrote about the
lawyer’s role, he was a business lawyer who was both a fan and a critic of
other business lawyers. 5 In matters of public concern, he viewed what we
would today call the large-firm lawyer as “the people’s lawyer,” charged
with leadership and identifying and promoting the public good. 6 In
representing her clients, the work of the business lawyer was noble; she
required the skills and moral judgment of a statesman. 7 In the early 1960s,
Erwin Smigel found that this view continued to dominate the way large
firm lawyers understood their role. His extensive interviews of large firm
lawyers in New York revealed that they viewed themselves first and
foremost as guardians of the law. 8
This all changed later in the 1960s. After that time, studies of large firm
lawyers found that they had discarded the governing class ideal for the
hired gun approach that had previously been a minority view. 9 Murray
Schwartz and David Luban have identified the two key elements of the
ideology that is dominant today: (1) extreme partisanship for your client
and (2) moral non-accountability, meaning that as long as you are an
extreme partisan, you have no moral obligations other than to pursue your
client’s ends. 10
Why this change? The conventional wisdom is that large law firm

4. See Russell G. Pearce & Amelia J. Uelmen, Religious Lawyering in a Liberal
Democracy: A Challenge and an Invitation, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 127, 130 (2004)
[hereinafter Pearce & Uelman, Religious Lawyering] (drawing upon the distinctions made
by Joseph Allegretti in his book, JOSEPH ALLEGRETTI, THE LAWYER’S CALLING: CHRISTIAN
FAITH AND LEGAL PRACTICE (1996)).
5. LOUIS BRANDEIS, BUSINESS: A PROFESSION 331-33, 335 (Hale, Cushman & Flint
1993) (1996). See Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America’s Governing Class: The
Formation and Dissolution of the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer’s Role, 8
U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 381, 401-02 (2001) (citing Brandeis’s comments on lawyers)
[hereinafter Pearce, Governing Class].
6. See Pearce, Governing Class, supra note 5, at 401. Brandeis saw the role of the
“people’s lawyer” to weigh fairly the interests of the individual clients and the common
good. See BRANDEIS, supra note 5, at 337.
7. See Brandeis, supra note 5, at 335.
8. See ERWIN O. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER: PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION
MAN? (1964); see also Pearce, Governing Class, supra note 5, at 381, 405-07.
9. See id. at 407-10.
10. See Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66
CAL. L. REV. 669, 671-73 (1978); DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL
STUDY 10 (1988).
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lawyers have gotten greedy since the 1960s. 11 No matter how often this
mantra is repeated, it is not persuasive. Let’s face it: from the creation of
what we know as the corporate law firm in the late 19th century, making
money has been its raison d’etre—making money for big-business clients
and for their lawyers. 12
So what really happened? Society shifted in the 1960s. Most of the
American elite, including lawyers, embraced the idea that people were
fundamentally self-interested and not concerned with the public good. 13 If
this were true, the only role that made sense for lawyers was that of an
amoral hired gun. 14
Two changes in the profession facilitated this shift. The first was the
creation of public-interest law as an area of practice in the 1960s.15 The
concept, as well as the label, of “public interest” law helped shift
responsibility for the public good away from large firm lawyers to this
small segment of the bar. 16 The second was the new ethical duty of pro
bono. 17 Helping the poor had always been one of the general obligations of
lawyers as the governing class, but the notion of a separate and distinct
ethical duty dates only to the 1960s.18 Pro bono completed what publicinterest law began. Within the practice of the large firm lawyer, it helped
move the public good from the center to the margins of the large firm
lawyer’s work. 19 Today, business lawyers like my friend are operating
with two contradictory ideologies: the hired gun conception which requires
lawyers to serve as amoral advocates; 20 and a professionalism model which

11. For an elaboration of this and other rationales for the collapse of professionalism,
see Pearce, Governing Class, supra note 5, at 411-12.
12. See id. at n.307 and accompanying text.
13. See id. at 415-17; Pearce et al., Revitalizing the Lawyer-Poet, supra note 2, at nn.
22-24 and accompanying text.
14. See Pearce & Uelmen, Religious Lawyering, supra note 4, at 148-49.
15. See Pearce, Governing Class, supra note 5, at 417-19. Although a few selfconscious public interest law firms, such as the NAACP and the ACLU, existed long earlier,
the establishment of a public interest bar of significant size dates from the 1960s. Id.
16. Id.
17. See id. at 419-20.
18. See id. at 419-20; see also Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 6-20 (2004); Erichson, supra note 1, at 2108-11, 2115-16; Judith L. Maute,
Changing Conceptions of Lawyers’ Pro Bono Responsibilities: From Chance Noblesse
Oblige to Stated Expectations, 77 TUL. L. REV. 91 (2002); Note, The New Public Interest
Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069 (1970); Pearce et al., Revitalizing the Lawyer-Poet, supra note
2, at 912 n.28.
19. Pearce, Governing Class, supra note 5, at 420 (“[P]ro bono permitted lawyers to
compartmentalize their public service obligations and avoid the governing class tension of
mediating between client interests and the public good.”).
20. See note 10 supra.
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condemns lawyers for failing to pursue the public good. 21
How have lawyers responded? Large numbers of lawyers believe they
are self-interested and all about money. 22 Large numbers of lawyers also
feel very bad about themselves. It is no surprise that the rates of substance
abuse and anxiety-related mental illness are far higher for lawyers than for
other occupations, 23 or that according to most surveys job satisfaction is far
lower. 24
How did the organized bar respond? In 1984, Chief Justice Burger
declared that law had become a business and that professionalism was in
crisis. 25 In response, the bar declared war: a war of professionalism
rhetoric, professionalism commissions, professionalism codes, mandatory
ethics and professionalism continuing legal education courses, and pro
bono, pro bono, pro bono. 26
What is the result of the bar’s twenty-year professionalism campaign?
Not much. 27 Why? If most lawyers think they are in law to make money,
you just can’t convince them that they are really working for the public
good. 28 If you make that argument, they are going to think you are either a
hypocrite, a cynic, or a fool. 29
21. See Pearce & Uelmen, Religious Lawyering, supra note 4, at 146-47.
22. See, e.g., Pearce, Professionalism Paradigm, supra note 2, at 1251.
23. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 87 (1994); G. Andrew
Benjamin et al., The Prevalence of Depression, Alcohol Abuse, and Cocaine Abuse Among
United States Lawyers, 13 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 233, 240 (1990); Lawrence S. Krieger,
What We’re Not Telling Law Students—and Lawyers—That They Really Need to Know, 13
J. L. & HEALTH 1, 3-4 (1998-99); Pearce & Uelmen, Religious Lawyering, supra note 4, at
149-50; Patrick Schlitz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy,
Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 874-76 (1999).
24. See GLENDON, supra note 23, at 85; Pearce & Uelmen, Religious Lawyering, supra
note 4, at 149; Schiltz, supra note 23, at 881-92. But see, e.g., John P. Heinz et al., Lawyers
and Their Discontents: Findings from a Survey of the Chicago Bar, 74 IND. L.J. 735, 736
(1999). For more extensive discussion of the complexity of measuring job satisfaction, see
Pearce et al., Revitalizing the Lawyer-Poet, supra note 2, at 914 n.37; Schiltz, supra note 23,
at 884-89.
25. Warren E. Burger, The State of Justice, 70 A.B.A. J. 62, 63 (1984).
26. Pearce & Uelmen, Revitalizing the Lawyer-Poet, supra note 2, at 912 n.31; Deborah
L. Rhode, Law, Lawyers, and the Pursuit of Justice, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1543, 1556
(2002).
27. See Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research on
Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337, 1347 (1997);
Eugene R. Gaetke, Renewed Introspection and the Legal Profession, 87 KY. L.J. 903, 909–
10 (1999); Pearce & Uelmen, Religious Lawyering, supra note 2, at 148-49; Rhode, Law,
Lawyers, and the Pursuit of Justice, supra note 26, at 1556.
28. See, e.g., Pearce, Professionalism Paradigm, supra note 2, at 1251.
29. Id. at 1266. Tom Shaffer has noted the irony of bar leaders’ claims that “lawyers
who are ‘paid well . . . from the profits of commercialism act in the spirit of public service,’
but that business people ‘who practice commercialism do not.’” Id. at 1260 (quoting
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As for pro bono, like other forms of charity, it is a good deed. But
unless you place it within the context of broad moral obligation, it serves to
relegate the public good to the margins of legal practice.30 What might
make a difference? Instead of trying to separate making money and doing
well, we should try to integrate the two. How would you go about that?
First, adopt a realistic conception of commitment to the public good.31
Most of us are neither saints nor sinners. We are not morally superior by
virtue of being lawyers. We are just like everyone else. We want to make
money and we want to do good. 32 That means, just like everyone else, we
are morally accountable for what we do. 33
Applying this idea to practice does not require automatically taking sides
between, say, Monroe Freedman, Larry Fox, or Abbe Smith’s strong
version of advocacy 34 and David Luban, Deborah Rhode or Bill Simon’s
more circumscribed conception. 35 But what it does mean is that all of us,
whatever our views, have to justify our approach morally rather than
simply assuming it as the bar too often does today. 36
Second, moral responsibility does add one specific obligation: we must
counsel our clients on the moral implications of their actions. 37 In doing
so, we could teach clients moral accountability to the law and to society.
Today’s lawyers, in contrast, too often promote or reinforce the
instrumental attitude of the Enrons and the AIGs, grounded exclusively in

Thomas L. Shaffer, Lawyer Professionalism as Moral Argument, 26 GONZ. L. REV. 393, 403
(1990-91)).
30. Pearce, Governing Class, supra note 5, at 420.
31. Pearce et al., Professionalism Paradigm, supra note 2, at 1270-71, 1274-75; Russell
G. Pearce, Law Day 2050: Post-Professionalism, Moral Leadership, and the Law-AsBusiness Paradigm, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 9, 19-23 (1999).
32. See, e.g., Pearce et al., Revitalizing the Lawyer-Poet, supra note 2, at nn.63-67 and
accompanying text.
33. Id. at n.63 and accompanying text; Pearce, Professionalism Paradigm, supra note 2,
at 1268-76; Russell G. Pearce, Model Rule 1.0: Lawyers are Morally Accountable, 70
FORDHAM L. REV. 1805 (2002) (hereinafter Pearce, Model Rule 1.0).
34. See MONROE FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYER’S ETHICS (3d ed.
2004); Lawrence J. Fox, The Fallout From Enron: Media Frenzy and Misguided Notions of
Public Relations Are No Reason to Abandon Our Commitment to Our Clients, 2003 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1243 (2003).
35. See generally LUBAN, supra note 10; DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF
JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2000) [hereinafter IN THE INTERESTS OF
JUSTICE]; WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS
(1998).
36. Pearce, Model Rule 1.0, supra note 33, at 1806-07; FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note
34, at 60; RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 35, at 8, 11, 38, 65.
37. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, supra note 35, at 66-67; Pearce, Model Rule
1.0, supra note 33.
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material self-interest. 38 This proposal does not require a change in the
rules. Rule 2.1 already permits moral counseling. 39 Nonetheless, most
lawyers believe their role requires they take the amoral approach and
ignore the permission to provide moral counsel. 40
To change lawyer conduct, we need a clear statement from the courts
and the bar that the lawyer’s role properly understood requires lawyers to
be morally accountable. A simple way to accomplish this objective is to
promulgate a new, aspirational Model Rule providing that lawyers are
morally accountable.41 Until the American Bar Association adopts this
new Model Rule, the large law firms have a wonderful opportunity for
leadership. They can serve as a model for the rest of the legal profession
by pledging publicly to accept moral accountability and to provide moral
counseling to their clients. The large firms can also serve as the political
force within the bar to promote the new rule of moral accountability.
A new Model Rule restoring moral accountability to lawyers will
certainly not resolve all the problems of the legal profession. It is only a
first step. Yet if we discard the business-profession dichotomy and
embrace moral accountability, it will make a big difference for the
transactional lawyer whom I mentioned at the beginning of my talk. 42 We
will then recognize that business lawyers like him are the exemplars of
doing good while doing well. Even more important, maybe he will
recognize it too.

38. See Nancy B. Rappaport, Enron, Titanic and The Perfect Storm, 71 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1373 (2003); William H. Simon, “From the Trenches and Towers”: The Kaye Scholer
Affair: The Lawyer’s Duty of Candor and the Bar’s Temptations of Evasion and Apology,
23 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 243 (1998); Eli Wald, Lawyers and Corporate Scandals, 7 LEGAL
ETHICS 54 (2004).
39. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 2.1 (2002) (“In representing a client, a lawyer
shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering
advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral,
economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client’s situation.”).
40. See notes 36 and 38 supra.
41. Pearce, Model Rule 1.0, supra note 33.
42. Pearce, Professionalism Paradigm, supra note 2, at 1267-76; Pearce et al.,
Revitalizing the Lawyer-Poet, supra note 2, at 146-52.

